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ABSTRACT 
Price behaviour of the Hong Kong shares with rights issues in 1991 and 1992 
are examined to test the efficiency of the Hong Kong stock market in the semi-strong 
form. 
Shares earn on average a negative abnormal return of 10% on the day 
immediately after rights issue announcement and a cumulative negative abnormal 
return of 22.5% on day 30 from the announcement date. These findings lead us to 
conclude that the Hong Kong stock market is inefficient in the semi-strong form in 
respect of rights issues. 
Investors are recommended to sell their shares immediately after the rights 
.» 
issue annoucement, particularly if there is a great discount to the underlying net asset 
value because the shares can be bought back more cheaply on Day 30. 
- i -
The Price Pressure Hypothesis is found to better explain better the price behaviour 
of Hong Kong shares having rights issues. In general, the more rights per share, the 
greater the share price will fall. 
- i i -
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In Hong Kongj just like in any other countries with more developed stock 
market, rights issue is a convenient way for listed companies to raise new capital. 
During the years 1988 to 1992, listed companies in Hong Kong raised a total of 
HK$40.8 billion through rights issue, this represents about 28% of the total funds 
raised from the Hong Kong stock market during the same period and is the second 
most commonly used method after placement in raising new capital. (Please refer to 
Table 1 for a breakdown of the fund raising methods in Hong Kong.) This is 
followed by consideration issue where a company issues new shares as consideration 
for some assets. Issuing and exercising of warrants is also a popular way of raising 
new money. Nonetheless, rights issue are so important because this method enables 
a company to raise a large amount of new equity within a relative short period of 
time. All the other methods in general are subject to some sort of restriction on the 
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percentage of new shares issued. It is therefore interesting to investigate how share 
price (and hence shareholders wealth) changes with the announcement of this popular 
fund raising method. 
Since from 1970，s，the academic community divides market efficiency into 
three categories : 
(1) Weak-form - investors should not be able to consistently earn abnormal return 
by simply tracking historical prices. 
(2) Semi-strong form - current stock prices fully reflect all the public information 
and announcements. 
(3) Strong-form • securities prices reflect all the private and public information. 
This research paper is an event study of rights issues in Hong Kong, involving 
tests of semi-strong form market efficiency. Test of semi-strong form of EMH is 
primarily concerned with how fast share prices adjust to the publicly available 
information upon its announcement, in this case, the announcement of rights issues. 
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One of the first studies to examine the semi-strong form of EMH was 
performed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll ("FFJR"). The method used by FFJR 
was to compute abnormal returns based on the market model : 
AR^ = % - (a - b l U 
where AR^ = the abnormal return on share j at time t 
Rjt = the actual return on share j at time t 
Rnrt = the market return at time t 
a, b = the regression coefficients 
FFJR calculated the average abnormal return of the securities being studied 
by finding the mean ARjt. The other important technique used by FFJR was to 
measure the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) by adding the average 
abnormal returns of the securities over time, with the time period centered around the 
date of the event or the announcement of information. The CAAR method provides 
a picture of the average price behaviour of securities over time and in general, if 
markets are efficient the CAAR should not be statistically too different from zero. 
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There are two hypothesis on the price movement of shares after announcement 
of rights issues. A widely held view is that rights issues will increase the supply of 
shares and hence produce a depressing effect on shares prices. This is commonly 
referred to as the Price Pressure Hypothesis. The alternative view is the Substitution 
Hypothesis which assumes the demand for a particular company's share is perfectly 
elastic because of the existance of very close substitutes in the form of other risky 
assets. The perfect elasticity means the increase supply in shares will not result in 
any noticeable price change. This research paper will also attempt to test which 
hypothesis can better explain the common stock price movement in Hong Kong. 
This research paper mainly adopts the approach used by Paul Marsh in his 
article named "Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the UK Stock Market" in 
the Journal of Finance Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, September 1979. 
Definition of Rights Issue 
In Hong Kong, the Companies Ordinance does not require companies to grant 
a statutory pre-emption right to shareholders to subscribe for rights issue although 
Section 57B does encourage companies to do so. Existing shareholders are offered 
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the right to subscribe for new shares at a predetermined price at the end of the rights 
issue period. Existing shareholders have the option to subscribe or just let the 
subscription right to expire or more commonly sell the rights in the market. Rights 
therefore can be regarded as short-term stock options granted by the company to its 
shareholders and accordingly option pricing models can be used to determine the fair 
value of the rights and the ex-right share price. Since the announcement of rights 
should not change the risk profile of the company immediately and nothing extra 
offers to or taken away from the shareholders, other things being equal, the package 
of the option plus the ex-right value of the share should be the same as the value of 
the share before announcement of rights. In reality, this assumption of constant value 
does not hold because shares value does react to rights issue. 
It is mentioned above that the subscription rights will expire within a short 
period of time and such period usually ranges from 30 days to 45 days. It is also 
quite common in Hong Kong that companies distribute bonus warrants to their 
shareholders. From a theorectical point of view, as far as the existing shareholders 
are concerned, a bonus warrant issue is the same as a rights issue except that the 
exercise period for the former is longer than the latter. Despite such close similarity, 
bonus warrants issues are viewed quite differently from rights issues by finance 
managers, merchant bankers and investors. It appears that warrant issues are much 
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more welcomed by the market than rights issues. Although the writer beleives that 
warrants and rights should not be viewed differently, for the purpose of this research 







J. Russell Nelson in December 1965 did a research on "Price Effects in Rights 
Offerings" (Journal of Finance, Vol. 20, No. 4). J.R. Nelson studied all the stock 
rights offering in 1946 to 1957 in the United States and found that the share prices 
(adjusted by the Standard & Poor's Industry Indexes, i.e. assuming the Betas of all 
the shares are 1.00) declined by 0.2 percent during the period six months before 
announcement of rights to six months after the close of rights trading. J.R. Nelson's 
conclusion was that rights issues had the similar split effects as stock splits and stock 
dividends. His finding of significant drop in share prices associated with the 
announcement of a rights issue is inconclusive because the price effect might be due 
to announcements of other events at the same time and secondly Nelson failed to 
identify the anouncement date as day 0. Thirdly, he assumed the same Beta of 1.00 
for all the shares. 
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R.W. White and P. A. Lusztig in March 1980 did another research called "The 
Price Effects of Rights Offering" (Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 
XV，No. 1，March 1980). White and Lusztig, using the market model, examined the 
stock price data in U.S. during the period July 1962 to December 1972. They 
concluded that there was a significant drop in share price associated with the 
announcement of rights offering. 
M.S. Scholes examined a sample of 696 rights offering between 1926 and 
1966 in "The Market for Securities : Substitute Vs. Price Pressure and the Effects of 
Information on Share Prices" (Journal of Business, April 1972) using the market 
model. His finding was that there was abnormal return before the rights issue date 
followed then by an abnormal loss of 0.3 percent in the month of the issue. Scholes 
rejected the Price Pressure Hypothesis because he found that the abnormal loss in the 
month of the issue had no relationship with the size of the rights issue. 
C.W. Smith in "Substitute Methods for Raising Additional Capital : Rights 
Offerings vs. Underwritten Issues" (Journal of Financial Economics, December 1977) 
found abnormal returns of around 8% to 9% in the year before the rights issue date 
and then a price decline of 1.4% in the two months preceding the issue date. These 
findings indicate a small price pressure on shares near the rights issue announcement 
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date. 
The above studies are all on the stock markets in the United States. Similar 
studies actually had also been done on other stock markets. 
R. Ball, P. Brown and F.J. Finn in "Share Capitalization Changes, New 
Information and the Australian Equity Market" examined 193 Australian rights issues 
between 1960 and 1969 and found that share price declined by 0.9 percent in the 
month after announcement. Again, this demonstrated the existance of price pressure. 
Paul Marsh in "Equity Rights Issues and the Efficiency of the UK Stock 
Market" (Journal of Finance, 1979) examined the rights issue in UK during 1962 to 
1975. In his very well-structured study, he found that although there were large 
positive abnormal returns prior to the announcement, share prices appeared to suffer 
a temporary setback of 0.9% during the immediate ex-rights period. He also 
concluded that in the UK market the demand curve for company's shares appeared 
to be highly elastic and his finding supported the Substitution Hypothesis. 
In Asia, Bobby Srinivasan and See Yong Kiat looked into the "Right Issues 
and Market Efficiency in the Singapore Stock Exchange". They examined data from 
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January 1976 to December 1984 and found that cumulative average residuals (CAR) 
took a nose-dive from one day prior to the announcement of rights issue to eights 
days from the announcement. The negative CAR continued up to day 60 which 
indicates a weak form of semi-strong efficient market. 





All the rights issues by the quoted conlpanics in Hong Kong between JU,lllulry 
1991 to Decenlber 1992 arc covered by this 8tuuy. (P1Cll~o scc 'fablc (2) for a 
complete list of rights issues during this p~riod.) I)nily Closing prices of th~ stockN 
are obtained from the Bloolnbcrg Financial Scrvicc~. 
The scope of this study is constrainteo by the followirur. fact()r~ : 
(a) The Bloomberg Financial Services only c()ntain~ (""'Jug Kong stock pdeo dUUl 
from M,arch 1990 ,which IneaflS for paraJ11cter (e.g. Beta) C!~tirflalion, th 
earliest data is in March 1990 and therefore we Clln onJy eXCl(ninc riu.hl8 iNNlICN 
earliest in late J 990. 
- J 
(b) It is difficult to identify the announcement date and the events or news 
affecting the share price around that date if it is too long ago. There is no 
problem in identifying the ex-rights and the payments dates but these dates are 
considered not meaningful in comparison with the announcement date for the 
purpose of testing semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. 
There are altoghter 40 rights issues in 1991 to 1992. However, not all these 
rights issues can be used for this analysis because the sample size is further reduced 
after meeting the following criteria : 
(1) There must not be other announcements made, for example, earnings or bonus 
warrants at or around the annoucement date of rights issues. 
(2) There is no suspension in trading of the shares during the parameter 
estimation or the study period. 
(3) There must not be a prolonged period without trading. 
(4) There must not be major change in corporate structure. 
Data on announcement dates are obtained from the Hong Kong Economic 
Journal and further proved its accuracy by checking the Wardley Cards. These two 
information sources are also used to find out whether there are other announcements 
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which may lead to data contamination and abandonment. 
Out of the 40 sample data, 25 must be discarded because there were either 
other announcements at the time of rights issue announcement or there were free 
warrants given together with rights. The sample size is therefore inevitably reduced 
to 15. 




In testing the semi-strong form of market efficiency, we are testing whether 
share price fully reflects within a short period of time the effects of rights issues 
announcement. Conceptually, we are testing : 
E(ARi t+i/IJ = 0 
where AR^ t+i = the abnormal return on share j at time t+1 
It = the information contained on the announcement of rights issue. 
；\ 
If the market is efficient in the semi-strong from, the expected value of the 
abnormal return should be equal to zero. 
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After examining the previous studies, it is noticed that the following three 
models have been used by researchers for basic residual analysis : 
(1) = 
(2) = 
(3) AR^t 二 Rit-((l-b)Rft + bR„J 
where AR t^ = the abnormal return on share j at time t, i.e. the residual 
Rj t 二 actual return of share j at time t 
Rn, t 二 market return at time t 
Rft = risk free interest rate at time t 
a = Alpha, the y-intercept estimated from least square linear regression 
b = Beta, the slope estimated from the least square linear regression. 
Model (1) is the simpiiest form of residual analysis and is the model used by 
J.R. Nelson. The drawback of this model is that it is assumed that all the shares have 
the same Beta of one and�an Alpha of zero. Unless there is an insurmountable 
limitation on data availability and hence affect the two-stage time-series methedology 
(i.e. model (2) and (3)), it is always not satisfactory from a research viewpoint to use 
model (1) as noise can be introduced if the Alphas and Betas are actually not equal 
to zero and one respectively. 
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Model (2) is the Market Model used by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) 
in analyzing the effect of stock splits on share prices. This is a two-stage analysis. 
The first stage consists of Alpha and Beta estimation of each security in the sample 
using data before the announcement date. In the second stage, these parameter 
estimates are used to calculate abnormal return around the announcement date of 
rights issues. The problem of this model is that it involves estimation of two 
parameters, Alpha and Beta. Alpha can very easily become systematically biased and 
be different greatly if different estimation periods are used and errors can be 
introduced due to the instability of Alpha. 
The third model is the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model and is the 
model used in this research. CAPM is used because only one parameter (i.e. Beta) 
is needed to be estimated and the probability of having errors due to incorrect 
estimation is reduced. 
To re-state, the model used is : 
AR t^ = Rj t - ( ( l -b ) R f t - bR^t) 
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According to the model, the stochastic portion of a share return can be divided 
into the systematic component and an unsystematic, i.e. firm specific, component. 
The systematic part is explained by its normal relationship with the market portfolio. 
Without unusual price effects, the average of AI^ is randomly distributed around zero 
and there is no significant difference in the residual distribution in a particular date, 
i.e. E(AIVI) = 0. 
The daily return of each sample share is computed by the following formula: 
where Pj t = Price of share j at time t 
Djj = Dividend of share j at time t 
The Hang Seng Index is used as the proxy for the market portfolio although 
it is recognized that the market portfolio should be more diversified than the Hang 
Seng Index. The daily market return is computed according to the following formula: 
R. t = ( M M - i ) - l 
where Mt = Hang Seng Index at day t 
Mt_ 1 = Hang Seng Index at day t - 1 
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The 3-month Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (fflBOR) is used as an 
estimation of risk free interest rate (RfJ. 
The same methodology used by FFJR in calculating the cumulative average 
abnormal return CAAR is used. The average abnormal return (AAR) and CAAR are 
calculated as follows : 
1 n 
AAR, = — E ARjt 
n j = l 
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The prices of the shares in the sample during the 90-day from the period from 
-120 to -30 days are used to estimate the Betas of the shares. The Betas are then 
substituted in the CAPM to calculate the abnormal return for the pre-announcement 
(-30 to 0) and post-announcement (0 to 30) periods. 
There is a second Beta estimation because the funds from the rights issues are 
used either for debt reducing or for business expansion. The former use will have 
the effect of reducing the Beta because of change of capital structure whilst the latter 
will increase it because of change of operating risks. We need to ascertain whether 
Beta will be changed by the rights issue. If there is any significant change in Beta, 
the so-called abnormal return calculated from the Beta in the first estimation period 
is questionable. The entire study is based on the assumption that the Beta obtained 
from regression of pre-announcement data is a good measure of the systematic risk 
of the security. Any return in excess of the return estimated from the market model 
is regarded as abnormal return. As a result, if Beta has changed after the 
announcement date, the residuals derived from pre-announcement parameters may not 
actually be real abnormal returns. It is therefore necessary to use the Betas in the 
second estimation period to re-do the analysis in order to ensure the findings are not 
invalid. Table (3) shows the Betas of the shares in the two estimation periods using 
the OLS method. 
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To test the Price Pressure Hypothesis, in addition to divide the sample data 
into two portfolios and compare the AAR’s and CAR’s，the abnormal return of each 
share is regressed against the size of rights issue. If there is a higher price decline 
when the size of the rights issue is larger, the Price Pressure Hypothesis is accepted. 




Figure 1 shows the average residual of the sample shares from the period - 30 
days to + 30 days using the pre-announcement share prices to estimate the Betas. 
The average residual is largely within the 士1% range during the 30 days 
period before the announcement of rights issues. However, on the day immediately 
after the announcement, the share prices take a nose-dive with the average negative 
abnormal return jumped to more than 10%. This confirms the general belief that 
rights issues create a pressure on share prices. The average residual after Day 1 
fluctuates between +1 % to slightly more than -2%. The pressure on price does not 
disappear immediately as there are more days of negative abnormal returns than 
positive abnormal returns. 
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Figure 2 shows the cumulative average residual ("CAR"). This graph shows 
that price pressure starts as early as 30 days before the announcement and there is a 
CAR of about -4.0% from Day -30 to Day -1. This CAR, however, is small in 
comparison with the CAR after announcement. The CAR nose-dives to -10.1% on 
Day 1 and then maintains at around -10.0% until Day 7. Starting from Day 8，the 
CAR takes another around of decline and reaches -22.5% on Day 30. 
These results indicate that the Hong Kong stock market demonstrates a weak 
form semi-strong efficient market in respect of rights issues because abnormal 
negative return can still be seen on 30 days after the event announcement. Investors 
sell their shares on Day 1 after announcement of rights issues will be able to buy 
them back at 12.4% cheaper on Day 30. 
POST-ANNOUNCEMENT PARAMETERS 
As mentioned before, rights issues will change the risk characteristics of the 
shares and there is a possibility that Beta after the announcement of rights issues will 
be very different from before. In this research, it is found that the portfolio Beta 
before and after the announcement date changes only very slightly from 0.71 to 0.75. 
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In order to ensure that our results would not be contaminated by the change 
of Beta of individual shares, the Average Residual and Cumulative Average Residual 
have been recalculated with the post-announcement Betas. The results are shown in 
Figure 3 and 4 respectively. The table below compares the results of the two Beta 
estimation periods : 
Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement 
Beto Beta 
Average Residual Day 1 - 10.1% - 10.2% 
Cumulative Average - 4.0% - 5.0% 
Residual Day -30 to -1 
Cumulative Average - 22.5% - 21.7% 
Residual Day 1 to 30 
No. of firms with negative 80% 80% 
CAAR from Day 1 to 30 
At a confidence level of 90%, we conclude that the Average Residuals on Day 
One are the same by using pre-announcement or post-announcement Beta and the 
conclusion on the weak semi-strong efficient market of Hong Kong holds. 
It is however interesting to note that in spite of portfolio Beta does not change 
significantly, the individual Beta of the shares changes quite significantly. In general, 
those with small Betas experience an increase whilst high Beta shares experience a 
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reduction in Beta. There is no attempt to explain this phenomenon in detail in this 
paper. However, one possible explanation is that after the announcement of rights 
issues, the shares increase its visibility again and traded more in line with the general 
market during the period shortly after the announcement date. 
DISCOUNT TO NET ASSET VALUE 
In Hong Kong, many companies are traded at a discount to its underlying net 
asset value. There may be a lot of reasons attributable to this, but the most common 
reasons are always related to the majority shareholder's unfair treatment to the 
minorities. In most of these companies, the majority shareholders are also the 
management who have access to firm information that are not available to the general 
public. Investors are as a result react more drastically than required to unexpected 
actions suggested by the management. 
One common tactic used by such majority shareholders is that when the shares 
are traded below the net asset value, instead of arbitrage the value through 
privatization, the management will announce rights issues. In view of the poor 
trading record in the past and unsymetrical financial resources between majority and 
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minority shareholders, the smaller shareholders usually give up their subscription 
rights and the majority shareholder can increase its stake cheaply without the need to 
absorb the shares in the market and pushing up the buying price. 
There is an unconfirmed belief that shares trading at a deep discount to NAV 
would experience a larger decline in share price because of the dubious motive of the 
top managQment. 
Figure 5 shows the difference in CAR between sub-samples of shares. The 
first sub-sample consists of shares whose rights issue prices have a deep discount to 
the net asset values (in excess of 40%) and the second sub-sample consists of shares 
of a smaller discount. 
Discount to net asset value is defined as follows : 
D = R/[(Si X NAV + S2 X R)/(S, + S^)] 
where D = Discount to net asset value 
R = Rights issue price per share 
51 = Number of new rights shares 
52 = Number of old shares entitled to rights 
NAV = Net asset per share before rights issue 
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It is found that the sub-sampie with larger discount to NAV plunges by 13.3% 
whilst the second sub-sample declines by a smaller percentage of 6.4% on the day 
immediately after announcement. The difference in performance is 7.2%. 
To test whether the difference between the two average returns is statistically 
significant, we carry out the following hypothesis testing : 
Hq I Xj - X2 ~ 0 
Hi : Xi - X2 0 
J (SD!)2 ( S ^ 
SE = V + = 4.11% 
111 n^  
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Confidence level = 90%; Z-vaiue = 1.645 
where SDj = Standard deviation of return of sub-sample 1 = 9.04% 
SDj = Standard deviation of return of sub-sample 2 = 6.86% 
SE = Standard Error of difference between two means 
n!, 112 = Number of data in sub-sample 1 and 2 respectively 
Xi = Average return of sub-sample 1 
X2 = Average return of sub-sample 2 
The intervei of accepting Ho is calculated to be 士6.76%. 
Since the actual difference between the two averages is calculated to be 7.2%, 
Ho is rejected as the actual difference is outside the acceptance interval. 
Using a confidence level of 90%, these findings enables us to conclude that 
the sub-sample of shares with deeper discount to net asset value experiences a more 
significant decline than the other sub-sample on the day immediately after 
announcement. 
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The CAR of the first sub-sample reaches -29.2% on Day 30 whilst for the 
second sub-sample, the CAR is -14.8% on Day 30. We are not going to test 
statistically the difference between the Day 30 CAR’s of the two sub-samples because 
we cannot prove that AR^ and AR^+i are statistically independent and we have no idea 
on their co-variance. However, given the fact that the difference is statistically 
significant on Day 1 and the difference between the CAR's enlarges to 14.4% (from 
6.9% on Day 1)，it should be rather safe to say that the sub-sample with larger 
discount to NAV falls more on 30 days after rights issue announcement than the sub-
sample with smaller discount. 
Amount Raised From Rights Issues 
The other factor that we want to look at is whether the amount raised through 
rights issue will affect the share price. We again divide the sample into two sub-
samples. The first sub-sample consists of shares with larger dollar amount raised 
from the market (on average HK$9(X) million). The second sub-sample consists of 
smaller issue amounts (on average HK$230 million). 
Figure 6 shows the price performance of the two sub-samples. Sub-sample 
1 declines by 8.0% on Day 1 whilst sub-sample 2 drops by 12.4% in average residual 
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terms. 
Using a confidence level of 90% (with a standard error of 4.47% and 
acceptance region of ±7.35%), the difference between the average residuals of 4.4% 
on Day 1 between the two sub-samples lies within the acceptance region and we 
conclude that there is no significant difference on the Day 1 average residuals of the 
two sub-samples. 
On Day 30，the CAR of sub-sample 1 enlarges to -19.1% and sub-sample 2 
to -26.3%. The difference widens from 4.4% on Day 1 to 7.2% on Day 30. 
However, in view that we cannot conclude that there is significant difference on Day 
1 and we cannot prove independence of average residuals between successive days, 
we can only say that the amount raised from rights issue seems to have no effect on 
share price performance on 30 days after announcement. 
Right? I$sue Tprms � 
In the Price Pressure Hypothesis, rights issue will increase the supply of 
shares of a company in the market and will produce a depressing effect on share 
price. For example, if the rights issue term is 1 for 1，the supply of shares will be 
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doubled. Other things being equal, share price movement should have an inverse 
relationship with the rights issue terms if the Price Pressure Hypothesis is true. 
The sample again is divided into two sub-samples. Sub-sample 1 consists of 
shares having more rights per share which will result in a larger supply of shares to 
the market after issue. On average, shareholders of shares in this sub-sample are 
asked to subscribe 1.04 shares on every share they hold. Sub-sample 2 consist of 
shares with smaller number of rights per share and on average, the shareholders are 
asked to subscribe 0.38 share on every share they hold. 
Figure 7 shows the CAR between the two sub-samples and we can see the 
obvious difference in CAR on Day 30. Sub-sample 1 has a CAR of -38.2% whilst 
for sub-sample 2，the CAR on Day 30 is only -8.7%. 
The difference on Day 1 is less obvious. The average residuals are -14.2% 
and -6.5% respectively. The difference between the two averages is 7.7%. 
At a confidence level of 90% (with a standard error of 4.2% and an 
acceptance region of 士6.9%), the difference between the two averages is found to 
be statistically significant. We conclude that the sub-sample 1 experiences a more 
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significant price drop than sub-sample 2. 
Further test on Price Pressure Hypothesis 
The previous section on price performance of the two sub-samples of different 
rights issues terms clearly supports the Price Pressure Hypothesis and the value of the 
sub-sample with larger supply of shares through rights issues drop much more than 
the other one. However, in order to confirm that there is an inverse relationship 
between terms of issue and the subsequent price performance, we use the OLS 
method to test it again and the following two regression equations are found : 
(1) ARD, = -0.023 - 0.118T 
R-Squared = 0.40 
Standard Error of Estimate = 0.07 
(2) CARD30 二 0.021 _ 0.374T 
R-Squared = 0.46 
Standard Error of Estimate = 0.11 
where ARD! = Average residual on Day 1 after announcement of rights issue 
CARD30 = Cumulative average residual on Day 30 
T = Rights issue terms defined as number rights per share, 
(e.g. an one-for-two rights issue give a T value of 0.5) 
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The slopes are found to be -0.118 and -0.374 respectively. The regression x-
coefficients and the R-squares confirm the earlier findings that there is a negative 
relationship between the abnormal price movement immediately after announcement 
of rights and the additional supply of shares. 
This finding is very different from the findings of Paul Marsh in his study of 
the U.K. stock market as the y-intercept and the slope were found by him to be very 
close to zero and he rejected the Price Pressure Hypothesis. M.S. Scholes also 
rejected the Press Pressure Hypothesis as abnormal loss and size of rights issues were 
found to be independent. 
s 





In line with the previous studies on other stock markets, shares in Hong Kong 
also react negatively to rights issue announcements. The main difference is that the 
price adjustment in Hong Kong is found to be greater than in other stock markets. 
The Hong Kong stock market is also found to be inefficient in semi-strong 
form in respect of rights issues. Shares earn a greater cumulative negative abnormal 
return on Day 30 than on Day 1. Investors will be able to make money by selling 
their shares on Day 1 and buy them back on Day 30. 
； 
There is a negative relationship between the share price and the rights issue 
terms and we conclude that the Price Pressure Hypothesis can better explain the 
situation in Hong Kong. 
- 3 5 -
The major drawback of this study is the small sample size because of the 
limitation on data availability. As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
findings herein are sample-specific. It is however hoped that in the future when share 
price data and other information in relation to rights issues are more readily available, 
another research in greater scale can be done to validate the above findings. 
• 
- 3 6 -


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Date Company Rights Terms Amount Raised 
11 Jan 91 * Evergo 1 for 2 at HK$1.15 HK$313 M 
9 Apr 91 BurwiU Int’l 1 for 4 at HK$0.75 HK$86 M 
16 Apr 91 Swylin Int'l 1 for 4 at HK$2.50 HK$224 M 
29 Apr 91 Huey Tai 1 for 1 at HK$0.33 HK$236 M 
16 May 91 Paladin 1 for 1 at HK$0.93 HK$514 M 
21 May 91 * Hopewell 1 for 1 at HK$3.00 HK$5,647 M 
5 Jun 91 Tak Wing 1 for 2 at HK$1.10 HK$55 M 
26 Jul 91 * Novel Enterprise 1 for 2 at HK$0.80 HK$137 M 
11 Aug 91 * Grand Orient 2 for 1 at HK$0.10 HK$147 M 
15 Aug 91 * Dickson Concepts 1 for 2 at HK$5.25 HK$1,090 M 
4 Sept 91 * Regal Hotels 3 for 4 at HK$0.70 HK$810 M 
18 Nov 91 Cheuk Nang 1 for 1 at HK$1.35 HK$95 M 
11 Dec 91 * Emperor Int’l 1 for 1 at HK$0.78 HK$326 M 
23 Jan 92 China Paint 3 for 2 at HK$1.05 HK$580 M 
29 Jan 92 Kwong Sang Hong 1 for 4 at HK$2.05 HK$513 M 
31 Jan 92 Chuang's China 1 for 1 at HK$0.91 HK$101 M 
21 Feb 92 * Asia Orient 2 for 1 at HK$0.27 HK$203 M 
25 Feb 92 Innovisions 1 for 1 at HK$0.163 HK$72 M 
- 4 5 -
Announcement 
Date CQHI附 Rights Terms Amount Raised 
26 Feb 92 Continental Holding 7 for 10 at HK$0.25 HK$110 M 
2 Mar 92 * Jardine Motors 1 for 4 at HK$4.60 HK$439 M 
11 Mar 92 * Amoy Properties 3 for 10 at HK$4.40 HK$2,294 M 
11 Mar 92 * CDL Hotels 5 for 32 at HK$1.44 HK$686 M 
28 Mar 92 Asean Resources 7 for 10 at HK$0.20 HK$236 M 
2 Apr 92 Dynamic Holdings 2 for 1 at HK$0.33 HK$258 M 
8 Apr 92 South China Holdings 1 for 1 at HK$0.50 HK$130 M 
13 Apr 92 * Asia Financial 3 for 10 at HK$1.88 HK$274 M 
30 Apr 92 Lippo Ltd. 4 for 5 at HK$ 1.50 HK$629 M 
30 Apr 92 * Harbour Center 1 for 2 at HK$5.65 HK$593 M 
8 May 92 * Asia Standard 1 for 1 at HK$0.38 HK$462 M 
27 May 92 Uniworid Holding 1 for 1 at HK$0.03 HK$209 M 
27 May 92 * Chuang's Consortium 1 for 1 at HK$0.25 HK$285 M 
6 Jun 92 BurHngame Int，l 1 for 1 at HK$0.46 HK$379 M 
12 Jun 92 Magnificient Estate 1 for 1 at HK$0.20 HK$92 M 
23 Jul 92 China Strategic 1 for 4 at HK$3.10 HK$195 M 
27 Jul 92 International Tak Cheung 1 for 2 at HK$LOO HK$326 M 
30 Jul 92 Asean Resources 1 for 1 at HK$1.25 HK$359 M 
12 Aug 92 South Sea 2 for 1 at HK$0.90 HK$346 M 
- 4 6 -
Announcement 
Date Company Ri冲t琴 T^vm^ Amount Rmse/i 
18 Aug 92 Tai Fu Properties 3 for 1 atHK$1.10 HK$161 M 
26 Aug 92 Hwa Kay Tai 1 for 1 at HK$1.60 HK$691 M 
28 Oct 92 Paramount 1 for 1 at HK$1.35 HK$158 M 
* Shares without other simultaneous announcement and included in this research 
as sample data. 
Source : Hong Kong Economic Journal 
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